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~A  new  budget  crisis~  - ~Communities'  own  resources  almost 
exhausted"  - "Community  unable  to  make  ends  meet~  - ~Chaos 
in  Community  finances"  are  the  sort  of  headlines  that  seem 
to  appear  each  year  in  the  newspapers. 
Now,  just  three  months  after  a  substantial  increase  in  own 
resources  became  effective  and  less  than  two  years  aEter  the 
Fontainebleau  summit  came  up  with  a  solution  to  the 
budgetary  disputes  which  had  paralysed  the  Community  for 
almost  five  years,  the  Community  once  again  appears  to  be  up 
against  a  major  financial  problem. 
But  is  it true  that  the  Community  is  not  capable  of  managing 
its  finances?  Is  it true  that  financial  planning  is 
impossible  at  Community  level  ? 
I.  MISUNDERSTANDINGS  CONCERNING  COMMUNITY  FINANCE 
There  are  still  a  number  of  prejudices,  misconceptions  or 
misunderstandings  which  influence  public  discussion  of 
European  budgetary  questions  and  do  a  great  deal  of  harm  to 
the  Community's  image. 
1.  Is  the  Community  budget  too  big? 
The  Community  budget  is  actually  very  small,  especially  in 
comparison  with  national  expenditure  its  volume  in  1985 
was  28,400  million  ECU  (see  Table  1)  corresponding  to  : 2  ­
less  th'an  3%  of  national  central  gov:r~ .me .~ !: '  ,bu~&~ts, 
accounting  for  per  capita  expen~iture of  105  MEeu  every 
year,  i.e.  0.65  pfennig  a  day  f 'or  e.ve.ry  G~ ·r:man,  FF  2  for 
every  Frenchman,  afrs  13  for  eve~y  Belg~a~~ Lit  440  for 
every  Italian  and  20  p  for  ever ~ Britan.  Table  2  shows 
that  the  equivalent  contributions  tQ  natiQnal  b~dgets 
amount  to  DM  25  in  the  Federal  R~public,  FF  80  in  France 
and  Bfrs  507  in  Beligum  (see  Table  2); 
less  than  1%  of  the  GDP  of  the  Member  States; 
Note  public  sector  spending  in  the  Member  States 
accounts  for  more  than  half  (5fr.7%)  of  GNP  over  the 
Community  as  a  whole  (see  Table  3). 
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2.  Is  the  growth  rate  of  the  Community  budget  too  large 
compared  with  national  budgets? 
A  comparison  between  the  growth  of  the  Community  budget  and 
that  of  national  budgets  shows  that  they  have  evolved  in 
parallel.  Between  1979  and  1985,  the  Community  budget  rose 
from  14  OOOm  to  28  400m  ECU,  whereas  the  national  budgets 
of 	the  Ten  rose  from  527  OOOm  to  1  014  DOOm  - roughly  a 
doubling  in  each  case. 
There  have  undoubtedly  been  divergencies  in  the  short  term 
to  meet  specific  Community  needs.  Thus  Community 
expenditure  had  to  increase  more  strongly  between  1985  and 
1986  because  of  the  enlargement  of  the  Community,  and  there 
will  have  to  be  an  expansion  in  the  coming  years  in  the 
research  sector  if  Europe  really  wishes  to  face  up  seriously 
to  the  technological  challenge  which  threatens  its 
competitivity  on  the  global  level  (1). 
Simplistic  comparisons  between  the  growth  of  the  Community 
budget  and  that  of  national  budgets  are  pointless  since 
Community  policies 
start  from  a  much  smaller  base  (see  1) 
are still developing  and  must  include  the  financial 
effects  of  new  policies,  enlargement  and  other 
exceptional  factors  ; 
supplement  national  expenditure  and  thus  lead  to  savings 
in 	national  budgets. 
(1 	)Note  :  Rand  0  expenditure  takes  up  less  than  3  per 
cent  of  the  community  budget  at  present  and  represents 
only  about  2  per  cent  of  the  Member  States'  public 
expenditure  in  this  sector. - 4  ­
3. 	 Why  could  the  Community  not  manage  within  the  original 

own  resources  limit? 

Considering  what  the  Community  has  achieved  in  the  past 
fifteen  years  it is  surprising  that  all  this  cpuld  be  done 
within  the  original  1%  VAT  limit.  Indeed  when  the  ceiling 
was  placed  more  or  less  arbitrarily at  the  round  figure  of 
'%,  it was  hard  to  imagine  that  the  Community  was  going  to 
develop  in  the  way  it did  in  the  seventies  and  eighties  with 
the  creation  and  reform  of  the  structural  funds  (Regional 
and  Social  Funds,  Integrated  Mediterranean  programmes),  and 
the  establishment  of  new  policies  (industry,  research  and 
innovation).  Furthermore,  these  years  have  seen  the 
accession  of  six  new  Member  States.  For  some,  this  has 
invovled  corrective  mechanisms  financed  from  th~  Community 
budget  which  have  proved  extremely  expensive  in  budgetary 
terms. 
Despite  these  factors,  it is  interesting  to  note  that  the 
share  of  Community  expenditure  in  GOP  has  hardly  changed 
(rising  from  0.8%  in  1979  to  0.9%  in  1985)  and  that,  in 
absolute  terms,  the  Community  budget  has  developed  at 
practically  the  same  rate  as  national  budgets.  This  shows 
that  criticisms  of  "the  excessive  growth  rate  in  Community 
expenditure"  simply  do  not  bear  examination. 
Unlike  the  Member  States,  the  Community  is  not  allowed  to 
engage  in  deficit  financing  :  revenue  and  expenditure  must 
always  balance.  National  budgetary  authorities  on  the  other 
hand  can  turn  to  the  capital  market  to  cover  deficits  and  it 
is  well  known  that  they  have  made  no  small  use  of  this 
possibility  in  recent  years.  Community  finances  are  thus 
subject  t~  a  stricter  regime. - 5  ­
1000 
90 
80 1 ~-+-
70 
5 
million  ECU 
National  budgets 

Community  budget 

GRAPH  1 
Thousand 
40 
30 
Between  1979  and  1985  the  total  volume  of  the  Member  States' 
public  debt  rose  by  925  000  million  ECU,i.e.  60  times  more 
than  the  14  400  Mio  increase  in  the  size  of  the  general 
budget  of  the  Communities  over  the  same  period. - 6  ­
4.  Is  the  accession  of  Spain  and  Portugal  to  be  considered 
an  exceptional  burden  borne  sol~ly  by  the  old  Member 
State's? 
The  answer  is  no.  Although  the  volume  of  expenditure  in  the 
1986  budget  far  outstrips  that  in  the  1985  budge~,  revenue 
too  has  increased  sin~ e,  immediatel~ upon  accession,  the  two 
new  Member  States  contribute  fully  towards  the  financing  of 
the  Commurti ty  budget  . '>  Bu t  because  Commun i ty  pol icies will 
be  applied  only  gradually  in  the  initiial  years  after 
accession,  a  degressive  system  of  compensation  has  been 
devised  for  these  countries.  In  budgetary  terms, 
enlargement  has  thus  led  to  an  increase  in  both  revenue  and 
expenditure. 
5. 	 It is  sometimes  argued  that  net  contributions  and 
receipts  to  and  from  the  Community's  budget  give  an 
accurate  reflection  of  the  "profits"  and  "losses"  whLch 
Community  membership  brings  to  the  different  Member 
States. 
This  is  not  the  case.  The  net  transfers  reflect  only  a  very 
limited proportion  of  the  financial  and  economic  advantages 
of  European  integration  :  the  advantages  do  not  feature  in 
the  budgetary  accounting,  for  example  the  economic  effects 
of  the  spectacular  expansion  of  trade  - which  has  increased 
25-fold  since  the  beginning  of  the  Community  - and  the 
effects  of  competition  policy  and  of  monetary  stabilisation. 
A  simple  comparison  of  net  budget  transfers  comes  nowhere 
near  providing  an  adequate  indication  of  the  contrib'Jtions 
and  benefits  from  economic  integration  which  are  to  the 
advantage  of  all  Member  States.  The  Community  budget 
represents  a  limited part  of  the  whole  picture. - 7  ­
II.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  VAT  OWN  RESOURCES 
There  are  three  components  to  the  Communities'  own 
resources  :  customs  duties,  agricultural  levies  and  a 
proportion  of  VAT. 
The  nature  of  the  first  two  components  limits  their  volume 
and  development  potential. 
VAT  alone  can  provide  the  essential  basis  for  covering 
future  financial  requirements.  Moreover,  VAT  gives  the  best 
reflection  of  the  capacity  of  the  Member  States'  economies 
to  contribute  to  the  Community's  finances. 
Graph  2  below  shows  the  VAT  rates  applied  since  the  end  of 
the  seventies.  Following  a  period  of  relative  stability  up 
to  1981,  the  rate  jumped  considerably  in  1982  by  0.14%  to 
0.92%  and  practically  reached  its ceiling  in  1983  (0.998%). 
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It  can  be  seen  that  the  VAT  component .of  own  reso_ urces  was 
already  practically  exhausted  in  19B3,  i.e.  three  years 
before  the  maximum  rate  was  actually  raised.  The  budgetary 
deficit  which  then  accumulated  over  the  next  two  years 
(1984  and  1985)  was  finally  covered  by  direct  payments  from 
the  Member  States  under  an  intergovernmental  agreement 
designed  allow  the  Community  to  meet  its  legal  obligations. 
If  this  aspect  is  taken  into  acccount,  the  trend  in  the 
highest  VAT  rate  (simulation)  follows  the  curve  shown  in 
graph  3  below  : 
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This  graph  clearly  shows  that  the  available  volume  of 
additional  funds  within  the  higher  VAT  limit  of  1.4%  was 
already  practically  exhausted  even  before  the  measure  took 
effect,  so  much  time  being  needed  for  the  decision  to  be 
taken  and  then  to  be  ratified  by  the  national  Parliaments. 
What  are  the  reasons  for  this  sudden  development? 
Three  specific  factors  have  emerged  to  seriously  encumber 
the  Community's  financial  future: 
(a)  compensations  to  the  United  Kingdom  to  correct  budgetary 
imbalances,  as  agreed  by  the  European  Council  of 
Fontainebleau  in  1984 
(b) 	the  enormous  expansion  of  agricultural  expenditure; 
(cl  the  large  volume  of  appropriations  committed  under  the 
structural  funds  but  not  followed  up  by  payments  ("burden  of 
the  past"). 
(a) 	The  budgetary  impact  of  the  Council's  decision  of  30  May 
1980,  after  several  years  of  hard  bargaining,  to  grant 
compensation  to  the  United  Kingdom  from  the  general 
budget  is  clearly  reflected  in  the  increase  in  the 
take-up  rate  for  own  resources:  the  0.14%  jump  in  the 
VAT  rate  between  1981  and  1982  was  mainly  due  to  this 
decision,  which  involved  an  additional  sum  of  1  654 
million  ECU  for  1981.  Since  similar  sums  have  been  paid 
in  subsequent  years,  this  represents  a  permanent 
additional  burden  on  the  Community  budget. - 10  ­
( b)  The  u n;r. h e eked  r i s e  0 fagricu1 t u rail  expend i t  U'X' e  is 
clearly  the  most  :i!-mportant  and  most  alarming  factor 
a f fee tin9  the  f  u t u reof  the  COInmt!'n i t  Y 's  fina'r\ c e s • 
Expenditure  on  market  intervention  operation's  has  almost 
doubled  in  the  last  five  years,  i ncreasing  from  som'e 
11  000  million  ECU  in  19B1  to  more  than  21  d~o  millinn 
ECU  in  19B6.  The  t"easons  for  this  sharp  rise  are  we,ll 
known  ~  continuou~ and  rapid  inctease$  in  ag~icu1tural 
produc'tivity,  comb'ined  with  a  distinctly  smal,ler  rise  in 
consumFltion,  limiued  scope  for  ex'ports  to  tH'e'  worl,d 
market's  since  agr:i:cultural  over-'production  ha,s  become  an 
international  problem,  the  conseqment  drop  ito, world 
prices  and  the  accumulation  of  en~rmous  ~gricultural 
stocks. 
The  particularly  alarming  conclusion  for  the  bud~et  i~ 
that  this  considerable  incr.eas.e  in  agricul't.ura.l 
eXipenditure  in  recent  years  fails  t .o  reflect  the  true 
..  costs  of  the  CAP  for  two  reasons  . 
1. 	The  agricultural  stocks,  which  are  now  at  rec@rd 
levels  with  a  book  value  of  more  than  10  000 
million  ECU,  generate  costs  not  only  for  stor:.a,ge 
hut  also  as  a  result  of  th·e  Loss  in  value  of  tll'e 
products  as  storage  continues  (in  particular  m±lk 
products  and  beef  and  veal). - 11  ­
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2.  The  particularly  high  level  af  the  dollar,  especLally 
o v e r 	 the  pas  t  two  yea r s,  has  h a Gf  the  e f f e c t  0  f 
,
artificially  reducing  budgetary  expenditure.  Mainly 
through  the  workings  of  export  refunds,  a  104  rise  in 
the  ra·te  of  the  dollar  against  the  ECU  norrr l1a,.lly  leads 
to  a  budgetary  saving  of  around  1  000  million  BCU 
while  a  drop  in  the  dollar  rate  will  lead  to  a 
similar  loss. 
Graph  5  s how s  the  e f  f e c t  0  f  the  a:r t  i f ici a 1  S"a v i n g 
resulting  from  the  extremely  hdq~ dollar  rate  in  19B4 
and  1985;  the  simulated  expe·ndLture  assumes  a",  st+ ahle 
US D  / E CUrate  0  f  1. 1 a  for  the  per  i  0  d  1983  -..a 6 • 
Expenditure  on  price  support  would  have  been 
s i g n i  f i cant 1 y  h i g her  in  1  9 84  (bY  1  17 ami  11ion  E.C  U ) 
and  1985  by  2  840  million  ECU)  if  the  dollar  rate  had 
stayed  at  the  average  1983  level.  With  a  dollar-ECU 
rate  which  is  likely  to  be  even  lower  in  1986  than  in 
1983  it would  not  be  surprising if agricultural 
expenditure  in  1986  - and  possibly  in  future  years  as 
well  - were  to  rise  above  expected  levels. 
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These  two  factors  have  evidently  produced  a 
considerable  though  artificial  reduction  in  budgetary 
expenditure  in  the  past;  furthermore,  the  first  factor 
merely  defers  actual  expenditure  and  will  inevitably 
give  rise  to  even  greater  increases  in  the  future  when 
the  book  values  are  corrected.  The  second  factor  will 
lead  to  substantially  higher  costs  as  the  dollar 
returns  to  its  real  value  on  the  exchange  markets,  as 
it very  clearly  has  done  in  recent  months.  This, 
incidentally,  is  one  of  the  main  reasons  why  the 
Commission  has  been  forced  to  present  a  supplementary 
budget  for  1986. 
It  should  also  be  pointed  out  that,  on  the  basis  of 
Commission  proposals  dating  from  1983,  the  Community 
has  introduced  a  number  of  measures  which  will  yield 
savings  totalling  more  than  4  000  million  ECU  in  1986. 
These  measures  are  the  quotas  for  milk  and  guarantee 
thresholds  for  cereals,  oilseeds  and  processed 
tomatoes. 
Graph  6  shows  the  impact  of  these  savings  on  the  budget 
by  comparing  actual  expenditure  and  simulated 
expenditure  without  the  special  measures.  The  savings 
total  almost  3  000  million  ECU  for  1985  and  more  than 
4  000  milion  ECU  for  1986  It also  shows  clearly  how 
much  time  is  required  for  these  measures  to  be  fully 
effective. - 14  ­
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Finally,  the  effect  which  the  CAP  has  in  reducing 
national  expenditure  should  not  be  ignored • . According 
to  a  study  recently  published  by  a  group  ofndtional 
specialist  institutes  (1)  ,  national  public  expenditure 
on  agriculture  in  the  ten-iation  Community  increased  by 
only  some  12%  between  1975  and  1980,  rising  from  8  547 
million  ECU  to  9  520  million  ECU  while  the 
corresponding  expenditure  at  Community  level  increased 
by  153%  from  4  764  million  ECU  to  11  909  million  ECU. 
(1)  SEMA-Matra,  IFO,  Price  Waterhouse - 15  ­
Since  all  these  attenuating  factors  have  not  led  to  a 
real  stabilization of  agricultural  expenditure  in  the 
past,  it is  easy  to  see  how  much  determination  and 
support  the  Community  will  require  from  every  side  if 
it is  to  manage  to  regain  control  of  this  expenditure 
and,  at  the  same  time,  make  inroads  on  the  accumulated 
costs  carried  over  from  previous  years. 
(c)  Burden  of  the  past 
The  third problem  casting  a  shadow  over  the  future  of 
Community  finances  is  the  growing  discrepancy  between 
the  commitment  and  payment  appropriations  allocated  to 
the  structural  funds  since  1980. 
The  accumulated  commitments  awaiting  payments  under  the 
three  main  structural  funds  (Regional  Fund,  Social  Fund 
and  EAGGF  Guidance)  have  almost  tripled  since  1980. 
Like  the  failure  to  allow  for  the  depreciation  of 
agricultural  stocks,  this  leads  to  a  grave 
underestimate  of  the  true  budgetary  cost  of  community 
policies  and  merely  defers  expenditure  to  a  later  date. 
The  commitments  entered  into  under  the  structural  funds 
are  legal  obligations  for  the  Community  comparable  to 
expenditure  under  the  agricultural  rules.  The 
Commission  must  pay  the  bills  for  projects  in  respect 
of  which  commitments  have  been  properly  entered  into 
if it is  to  guarantee  operation  of  the  structural 
funds,  a  basic  test of  its credibility. - 1 G  ­
Graph  7  shows  the  trend  in  outstandin~ commitments  and 
payment  appropriations  granted. 
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If  the  Community  is  to  regain  control  of  this 
development,  a  fairly  substantial  amount  of  payment 
appropriations  must  be  provided. 
Graph  8  shows  the  effect  on  the  VAT  rate  if  sound 
budgetary  management  had  been  applied  in  these  two 
areas.  Maximum  VAT  rate  (%) 
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In  terms  of  -.Simulated  VAT  rates  for  the  years  1983-,85,  the 
correction  q'f  budgetary  imbalances,  a  y1 early  depr,eciation  of  the 
increase  in  agricultural  stocks,  and  an  appropriate  l~vel  of 
p.ayments  against  outstanding  commitment! s  under  th.e  ..structur,al 
funds  would  have  implied  a  considerably  highe.r  VAT  rate  than  the 
1.0%  limit  from  1983,  i.e.  three  years  before  the  1.4\  ceiling 
took  effect.  The  1.4%  r~te  would  actual[y  have  been  reached  in 
1985  if  the  true  costs  of  the  present  policy  had  h~en  fully 
accounted  for,. 
On  t he  who leonemus  t  note  t ha  t  no't  on l,l1r'  own  resour ,ce  s  , h.;a we  bee  n 
cans u m,e d,  d uri  n g  the  past  f e,w  y-e a r s,  ~ea:r 1 i e r  t han  if areseen,  but 
that  effective  demand  for  own  resour.ces  remained  c'll>ndera.bly  below 
the  level  which  would  be  realistic er  appropriate  from  a 
budgetary  point  of  view. 
The  bill will  have  to  be  paid  for  this  in  the  followinq 
exercices. 
Furthermore,  a  new  element  is  emerging  which  will  influence  th~ 
budget  as  regards  receipts:  according  to  the  most  r~cent 
projections  the  estimates  for  own  resources  from  VA'T  mu,st  he 
reduced  by  several  millions  of  ECUs.  The  ma~n reason  for  this  is 
the  considerable  reduction  of  the  rate  of  inflation  (estimated 
for  1987  at  3.4  %,  after  5  %  in  1986  as  the  Community  avera~£) 
which  automatically  reduces  the  VAT  receipt~. 
Although  this  may  be  regrettable  from  a  budgetary  point  of  view, 
one  should  not  ave r look  the  fact  that  the  Commun i ty  bud·g.et  has 
thus  to  bear  the  burden  of  two  new  elements  which  constitnte  in 
fact,  on  a  general  economic  lev< el,  indisput.ahle  andenc.oura.ging 
successes: 
- the  rapid  decline  of  the  Dollar 
- the  equally  spectacular  reduction  of  the  level  of  in~lation  in 
the  Community 
in  other  words,  two  objectives  to  which  the  Community  and  the 
Member  States  have  committed  themselves  for  some  time. 
If  these  have  materialized  to  an  un.expected  degree,  one  must  nbt 
on ly  see  the  negat  i ve  cons equences  for  t he  Carom uni ty  budg,et,  bu t 
equally  the  positive  effects  on  the  general  economy,  ,. particularly 
as  the  latter  are  by  far  more  important. - 19  ­
III. 	FOUR  YEAR  FORECASTS  - A  NEW  APPROACH  TO  MEDIUM-TERM 
FINANCIAL  PLANNING  AT  COMMUNITY  LEVEL 
What 	lessons  should  be  drawn  from  the  development  of  the 
budgetary  situation  and  wha t  solu tiona  can  be  fo·und  to 
escape  from  it and  to  restore  confidence  in  European 
finances? 
First,  strict management  is  necessary,  especially  in  the 
agricultural  domaine.  Only  by  a  common  effort  by  everyone 
concerned  can  one  regain  control  in  this  field. 
On  the  other  hand,  it is essential  to  ensure  that  in  solving 
agricultural  problems  - although  these  are  a  priority  - we 
do  not  paralyse  the  development  of  the  whole  range  of  other 
Community  policies. 
Secondly,  specific  measures  of  budgetary  policy  are 
necessary  in  order  to  restore  confidence. - 20  ­
There  are  three  main  reasons  why  the  Cammunity's. budgetary
I 
problems  ha,ve,  in  the  past,  often  caused  disputes  and 
~! 
controve  r sy  a t  both  pol iticaI  level  and  in  publ i lc  opinion 
a  lack  of  transparency  in  respect  of  budgetar ~ problems 
a  lack  of  consistency  between  policy  decisions  and  their 
budgetary  consequences  ; 
unforeseen  or  unforeseeable  events  and  developments 
beyond  the  Community's  control  (e.g.  world  ~g~ icultural 
prices  or  the  rate  of  the  dollar1. 
The  way  in  which  the  first  two  problems  are  dealt  with  at 
Community  level  could  and  should  certainly  be  ~mproved. 
Budget  transparency  should  be  strengthened,  as  well  as  the 
c.onsistency  between  political  decisions  and  the  financial 
consequences  which  flow  from  them. 
It is  in  this  context  that  the  Commission  sees  a  need  for 
medium-term  financial  planning  covering  at  least  three  or 
four  years  and  going  further  than  the  purely  forecasting 
exercise  conducted  in  the  "three-year  forecasts"  which  the 
Commission  has  published  each  year  when  presenting  the 
preliminary  draft  budget. - 21  ­
Mere  extrapolation  of  current  trends  is  of  limited  use  in 
planning  public  expenditure;  in  the  present  situation  of 
severe  financial  restrictions  imposed  at  all  levels,  public 
expenditure  planning  must  be  transparent  and  reliable, 
especially  at  Community  level.  Although,  for  a  number  of 
reasons,  the  Community's  financial  problems  cannot  be 
equated  with  national  public  finances,  it is  interesting  to 
note  that  most  States  operate  multiannual  budgetary  planning 
systems  of  varying  degrees  of  sophistication.  The  Community 
therefore  needs  an  instrument  of  this  type  to  enable  it to 
prepare  its  medium-term  financial  strategy  and  ensure  that 
the  financial  implications  of  the  specific policy  decisions 
are  incorporated  in  these  decisions  and  form  part  of  a 
longer-term  financial  strategy. 
The  maih  aim  of  such  an  instrument  is  to  establish 
priorities,  provide  a  longer-term  perspective  for  priority 
measures  and  thus  make  Community  measures  more  effective  and 
coherent. 
It is  with  this  in  mind  that  the  Commission  has  established 
a  new  system  of  four-year  budgetary  forecasts  which  take 
account  of  the  problems  and  prospects  set  out  at  III  and  IV 
above. - 22  ­
IV.  THE  FINANCIAL  PERSRECTIVES  1987  - . 1990 

The  Community's  own  resources  are  exp~cted to  grow  by  about 
6  per  cent  per  year  between  1987  and  1990.  On  the> 
expenditure  side  this  period will  be  ~arked by  tfte  steadily 
growing  participation  of  Spain  and  portugal  in  the  policies 
of  the  Community  and  by  a  restructuring  of  the  budget 
designed  to  ensure  that at  least  the  priority  po W tical 
commitments  are  respected. 
1.  Revenue  within  the  1.4%  VAT  limit 
Total  resources  available  within  the  1.4%  VAT  are  expected 
to  increase  from  about  39  830  million  ECU  in  1987  to  47  080 
million  ECU  in  1990,  an  average  annual  increase  of  5.7%.  As 
average  GDP  growth  is  5.9%  per  year,  the  share  of  own 
resources  in  GDP  will  drop. 
In  1987  about  2  400  million  ECU,  i.e.  6%  of  resources,  will 
have  to  be  set  aside  for  the  correction  of  budgetary 
imbalances. 
Allowing  for  this,  the  resources  available  will  increase 
from  37  430  million  ECU  in  1987  to  about  43  900  million  ECU 
in  1990,  an  average  annual  rate  of  increase  of  5.4%. - 23  ­
2.  Expenditure 
The  main  features  of  expenditure  between  1987  and  1990  will 
be  as  follows 
gradual  realization  of  the  Commission's  plans  for  the 
future  of  agriculture  in  the  Community,  provided' the 
proposals  made  are  adopted  by  the  Council  from  1986 
onwards.  The  expenditure  figures  for  the  EAGGF-Guarantee 
Section  have  been  calculated  according  to  the  EAGGF 
guideline  for  budget  discipline. 
A  substantial  increase  in  appropriations  allocated  to 
research; 
structural  expenditure  showing  a  cautious  increase  in 
terms  of  commitments  subject  to  the  gradual  stabilization 
of  the  burden  of  the  past  in  payments. 
A  reduction  in  the  automatic  repayments  to  Spain  and 
Portugal,  in  accordance  with  the  schedule  set  out  in  the 
Act  of  Accession. 
A  provision  is  entered  to  cover  new  policies  and 
actions.  This  provision  is  essential  for  the  development 
of  the  Community  because  none  of  the  existing  policies 
have  any  room  for  manoeuvre  beyond  objectives  already 
stated  by  Community  Institutions.  Any  new  and  desired 
initiatives  must  therefore  be  contained  in  this 
provision. - 24  ­
-Expenditure;  1987-1990 
1 •  EAGGF-Guarantee 
2 •  Structural  policies 
3 •  Research 
4. 	 Development 
coperation 
5 •  Other  policies 
6. 	New  policies 
7 • 	 Repayments  to 
I>lember  States 
8. 	Administratives 
-expenditure 
9. 	'TOTAL 
% 	 increase 
10 •  Highest  VAT  rate 
3.  VAT  rate  and  margin 
- Appropriations  for  payment  s 
('bti llion  ECU) 
1986  I 
1987  I 
1988  I~  1989  I 
1990 I 
1 :1  I  1  1  1 
I 
1  1  1  "  1 
22  012  06'1 I 24  481  ' 25  850\  27  436 23 1 
6  201  6  7  8  8  941 593 1  625 1  694 1 1  1 
437,61  59 2\  997 1  610 1 
9cJ6 
1 
1  1  1 	 1 I 
110,5\  167\  2141  252 1 
300 
I 
1 
367,7\  4:351  4721  492 1 
52 1 '
5  80'0 
1  I  80 1  400 1  600 1 
I  1  I  1 
3 	 307  2  2  757  2  207 956\  879\ I  I 
2 
I 	 I 
I 
1 	 1 
776,41  959  2  095\  2  204\  . 2  321 
I  I  I  I  I 
35 	 217,21 36  40  43  4.5  522 843 1  163 1  459 1 1 
I  I  I  I  I 
4,6  9,0  8, 2  4,8
1  1  1  1  I 
I  I  I  I  I 
1 , 371  1 , 431  1 , 49\  1,47
1  1 
I  I  I  I  I 
renaining 
rate  to  1.37  in  1937.  This  would  leave  a  nargin  of  about  590 
million  CCU  for  contingencies.  Recent  developments  in  the 
dollar/ECU  rate  are  liable  to  deplete  this  margin. - 25  ­
From  1988,  resources  available  within  the  1.4%  VAT  limit will  no 
longer  be  sufficient.  Also  it is  necessary  to  leave  a  margin  of 
0.1  - 0.2%  of  VAT  to  allow  for  factors  of  uncertainty  in 
forecasts,  notably  with  regard  to  EAGGF  Guarantee  expenditure, 
the  effects  of  enlargement  and  the  forecasts  of  resources. 
The  Heads  of  State  and  Government  at  Fontainebleau  recognized 
that  "the  maximum  rate  may  be  increased  to  1.6%  on  1  January  1988 
.....  The  figures  given  indicate  that  this  judgement  was  right 
an  increase  to  the  1.6%  will  be  needed  as  from  1  January  1988. SPOKESMAN'S  SERVICE  OF  THE  COMMISSION 
